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The objective of this paper is to compare different ways of designing agri-environmental contracts 
and to set targeting under adverse selection, comparing conditions before and after CAP reform 2003. 
The results suggest that the present contract structure may be relevantly improved through a more 
accurate design and a clearer target. The reform, through the decoupling mechanism, will contribute to 
reduce the opportunity cost of the adoption of agri-environmental measures. This may increase the 
optimal amount of public goods produced by agriculture and will encourage participation by farmers. 
However, in order to properly exploit the new conditions brought by the 2003 reform, it is necessary to 
review the way agri-environmental payments are assigned and their structure, in terms of targeting, 
contract differentiation and payment allocation. 
Keywords: Agri-environmental schemes, contracts, multifunctional agriculture, CAP Reform  
JEL classification: Q1 – Agriculture; Q18 - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Q2 - Renewable 
Resources and Conservation 
1.  Objective 
The development of the multifunctional role of agriculture is accompanied by the diffusion of 
innovative forms of contract aimed at creating incentives for the production of public goods by the 
sector. Some examples are the Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) proposed under regulation 2078/92 
and 1257/99. 
In the perspective of an increasing relevance of public services produced by agriculture, contract 
efficiency represents a key issue. In fact, only the reduction of unjustified rents and the containment of 
policy transaction costs seem able to guarantee a sufficient efficiency of public expenditure, the 
maintenance of sector’s credibility and the ability to allow economic reward for those farmers actually 
producing public goods appreciated by the whole society. Such need is perceived at all levels, 
including the EU that has explicitly inserted environmental and social efficiency criteria in the 
mechanism of allocation of agri-environmental payments in view of the reform of rural development 
programs (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). 
Some of the issues connected to such contracts may also be extended to cross-compliance. In fact, 
the farmer is faced with the choice between benefiting of a payment with some restrictions and giving 
up the payment with no obligations. The experience from US, for example, shows also for cross 
compliance the importance to tailor farming constraints on compliance costs and actual environmental 
problems of each area (Claassen et al., 2004). These issues, together with non-compliance, are a 
common feature of most cases of agri-environmental regulation (with and without payments) and 
represent a key factor affecting policy effectiveness and efficiency (OECD, 2004). 
The objective of this paper is to compare different ways of designing agri-environmental contracts 
under adverse selection with associated information and incentive costs. In particular, the interplay 
between contract design and targeting objectives is dealt with. The analysis is carried out before and after the CAP reform 2003, with the objective to analyse the interaction between the new CAP and the 
design of agri-environmental contracts. 
The structure of this paper is the following. In section 2 the state of the art about AESs analysis 
using contract theory approach is illustrated. In section 3 the methodology is described, followed, in 
section 4, by the illustration of the results of a case study. Some discussion is provided in section 5. 
2.  Background 
2.1. Delimitation of the object of the paper 
The economic literature about contract design under asymmetric information has developed 
widely in the last twenty years (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Salanié, 1998; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). 
Among the applications of this approach, AESs appear particularly pertinent. In fact, being based 
on public goods acquisition by numerous agents (farmers), diversified in terms of participations costs 
(transactions cost included) and the degree of compliance, and being this costs farm’s private 
information, the contracts proposed by the public administration are most frequently designed based on 
partial knowledge of the relevant information. 
The problem could be posed in two different perspectives. The first is adverse selection. The 
second is moral hazard. The adverse selection problem is relevant due to diversification of compliance 
cost among farmers, when the public decision maker is not able to discriminate farmers belonging to 
different types. The moral hazard problem emerges when the public decision maker is not able to 
control the degree of compliance of the contracts uptakedn and there are incentives for the farmers to 
be totally or partially non-compliant. 
In the following section we discuss the argument in two parts. First, we highlight the relevance of 
this issue for the operational decisions concerning agriculture policy. Secondly, we briefly discuss the 
main contributions from agricultural economics literature. 
2.2. Relevance of the problem 
For its own characteristics, the issue of contract design under asymmetric information and moral 
hazard can hardly benefit from precise and univocal data on the relevance of the problems under 
consideration. 
The data from mid term evaluations of the Rural development plans seem however to strengthen 
the idea that these problems are extremely relevant. For example, the economic impact evaluation of 
integrated production schemes in Emilia Romagna shows that, for peach and wheat, it would be on 
average profitable for farmers to participate in AESs even without any payment. For organic 
production this is true only for wheat, while it does not apply to peach (Emilia Romagna Region, 
2003b). This result may be due to the little differentiation of payments, with respect to the variety of 
farmers’ costs of compliance. Clearly, if the results correspond to reality, the actual incentive 
effectiveness would be very low, because it would have a minor effect on the cropping techniques. 
The very high compliance cost differentiation among farmers is confirmed by results from 
monitoring carried out in Emilia Romagna. In fact it brings evidence of compliance costs ranging from 
less than zero to more that 500 euro/ha (data not published from Emilia Romagna Region, 2003b). 
This evaluation, based on data reported by farmers, in most cases does not consider the non-
compliance. For example, the results from Emila Romagna controls show that only 57% of the farmers 
are totally compliant (Emilia Romagna Region, 2003a). The remaining may be mostly concerned with 
small non compliance. On the other side, most of the controls are based on some self reporting, so the 
degree of non compliance may be relevantly larger than detected. The problem is relevant both for the design and for the valuation of AESs. In fact, even ex post, 
without objective indicators about the change in the state of the environment, evaluation only based on 
uptake (the most frequent case) would supply an illusory measurement of the environmental 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
The argument, applied so far about AESs, is likely going to assume a more general importance, in 
relation to CAP 2003 reform, that introduces environmental conditionality and constraints on the use of 
land benefiting of payment rights. 
2.3. The contribution of the agricultural economics literature  
The agricultural economic literature has tackled the problem since the beginning of the 1990s. 
(Fraser, 1993). One recent literature review about this topic may be found in Latacz-Lohmann (2004). 
Briefly, the literature could be divided, with respect to the problems dealt with, in works that refer 
mainly to adverse selection, moral hazard or both. 
The adverse selection problem is treated by Moxey et al. (1999) and Gren (2004), through models 
that hypothezise the possibility to provide the farmers with a menu of contracts, able to induce farmer’s 
self-identification through contract choice. These models are based on the maximization of social 
welfare; this function is composed by environmental improvement benefits, by the benefit derived 
from the possible farmer’s income increase and by the cost of the distortionary effect of taxation, 
necessary to provide public funds. In alternative, the problem may be posed in terms of cost-
effectiveness, so eliminating the need to attribute monetary values to externalities and to quantify the 
distortionary effects of public funds (Havlik et al., 2003). 
One alternative way of facing the problem is through contract auctions. This instrument was 
studied by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997; 1998) and by Bazzani et al. (2000). 
On this topic, a large literature existents concerning the Conservation Reserve Program 
application in the United-State, in which the contract assignments were based on auction mechanisms. 
In spite of the theoretical advantages of such mechanisms for contract allocation, practical experience 
showed a number of limits (on this issue see for example Viaggi and Taff, 2004). 
The moral hazard problem is studied by different authors (for example Choe and Fraser, 1998; 
1999). In general, the models used to deal with this problem try to identify the optimal monitoring 
level needed to ensure farmers compliance. The result is represented by the optimal mix of payments, 
sanctions and the level of monitoring, in relation to farmers compliance cost. 
Less numerous are the contributions in which moral hazard and adverse selection are considered 
at the same time (for example White, 2002). In this case, the main thematic is represented by the 
interaction (synergy) between incentives aimed at self qualification and those aimed at compliance. 
One issue unfrequently seen in the literature is the interplay between contract design and targeting 
objectives. Targeting is a key feature in policy design and is often used as a proxy for the social value 
of environmental improvements, assuming it is correlated to the location with respect to e.g. sensitive 
area or high natural value areas (OECD, 2004). Targeting may well be interpreted as an issue as long 
as it entails a trade-off between the precision of the AES and its cost, as it may be assumed that a 
higher targeting will imply a more than proportional increase in policy costs (Romstad, 2004). 
3.  Methodology 
The methodology used in this paper is based on a principal agent model under adverse selection, 
where the public regulator does not explicitly know the monetary value of the externalities produced 
by the sector. As a consequence he has the aim of maximising the environmental improvement (or 
some proxy such as the uptake of some measure) given the budget available. The type of contract assumed is limited to input (in particular nitrogen use) reduction
1. It is assumed that the area interested 
by the schemes has heterogeneous characteristics, as for both environmental sensitivity (and, as a 
consequence, priority in AES) and farm characteristics (compliance costs). 
It is in the interest of the regulator not only to maximise the environmental improvement, but also 
pursue its concentration in priority areas. 
The decision problem may be described as follows: 
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i = area type: 1=target, 2= non target; 
j = farm type, j = (1, 2, …, m); 
ij λ  = percent of farms belonging to each combination of farm type and area type; 
ij q  = maximum input quota to be assigned to each combination of farm type and area type; 
ij p  = payment paid to each combination of farm type and area type; 
B = public budget available; 
τ  = ratio between the quota to be proposed in target areas and the quota to be proposed in non-target 
areas (degree of targeting). 
bc  is the budget constraint, while tc guarantees a certain concentration of AES impact (e.g. level of 
pollutant reduction) in target areas. This objective can be expressed in different ways. In the model 
adopted, the way chosen is that of a ratio between the degree of input of target areas and that of non 
target areas (roughly the same criteria applied in the nitrate directive). 
The implementation of the regulator’s program is constrained to the decision to participate by 
farmers, that is differentiated according to the information condition and to the form assumed for the 
payments. 
In the case of perfect information (first best) it is assumed that the regulator knows the costs of 
compliance of each single farmer and that, as a consequence, it is sufficient to guarantee with equality 
that the payment are higher than the compliance costs (assuming reservation utility equal to zero): 
 pc:    () ( )
* *
ij ij ij ij ij q p q π π ≥ +  (4) 
                                                 
1 The problem is extended, in the same form, to others actions, characterized by input reduction (for example 
integrate production) and, with some variations, to the actions that provide a change in land use (for example 
wetlands).  
where: 
( ) ij ij q π  = farm profit as a consequence of the quota assigned q; 
( )
* *
ij ij q π  = unconstrained profit. 
By maximising (1) constrained to (2), (3) and (4) we obtain the result, where the payment equals 
the compliance cost, calculated as the difference between the unconstrained and the constrained profit. 
In the case of asymmetric information, equation (4) still holds, but the payment cannot be directly 
calculated on the compliance costs, as they are not known to the regulator. However, the regulator can 
be assumed to know the value of compliance costs for each type of farmer and have some prior 
expectation about the frequency of each type. 
In this case, the best theoretical solution (revelation principle) is a menu of contracts built using 
mechanism design. The contracts are given by some combination of p and q for each farm type, such 
that: 
    v i ( i ) :     ( ) ( ) ' ' ij ij ij ij ij ij p q p q + ≥ + π π  (5) 
where: 
j’ = each farm type different from j. 
The constraint is active only for farms of the same area, given that, among areas, it is possible to 
discriminate according to farm location. 
By maximising (1) constrained to (2), (3), (4) and (5), it is possible to obtain a contract different 
for each combination of farm and area type
2, each one such that its choice is profitable for the farm to 
which it is addressed. 
One reference solution closer to the existing one is that of contract differentiated between target 
and non target areas, but not among different farm types. In this case the problem is solved by 
maximising (1) subject to (2), (3) and (4). In such a solution, the payment and the quota are indexed on 
i only (target or non target area). 
The hypothesis of proposing an input quota associated to a compensation payment may be 
substituted by the imposition of a reduction of input (r) compared with the private optimum, against a 
compensation. In such a case, the problem takes the following form: 
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The problem is analogous to the previous one, with the difference that the input quota (q) is 
substituted by a reduction of inputs. 
In the first best, the maximisation of the objective function is further constrained to an individual 
rationality constraint (assuming again zero reservation utility): 
      p c :     ( ) 0 ≥ − ij ij ij r c p    (4a) 
where  ( ) ij ij r c
  represents the compliance cost (with c’>0, c’’>0) as a function of r. 
By maximising (1a) constrained to (2a), (3a) and (4a) the optimal contract is found, that, in 
analogy with the previous case, is based on a payment equal to the total compliance cost. 
In the case of asymmetric information, the (4a) still holds, but the payment cannot be calculated 
directly on the (unknown) cost of each farm. The menu of contracts is given, in this case, by a 
combination of p and r for each farm type such that: 
 vi(i):    ( ) ( ) ' ' ij ij ij ij ij ij r c p r c p − ≥ −  (5a)   
The constraint, as before, is active between farms of the same area. The structure of the menu of 
contracts is obtained by maximising (1a) constrained to (2a), (3a), (4a) and (5a). 
Finally, the last solution among those considered here, is represented by an input reduction and an 
undifferentiated payment across farm types. In such a case the problem is solved by maximising (1a) 
constrained to (2a), (3a) and (4a), but using a payment and an input reduction indexed on i only (target 
or non target areas). 
Compliance cost functions may be regarded as dependent upon the policy framework in place. In 
this paper, costs functions have been estimated assuming two possible conditions: the first under the 
Agenda 2000 rules and the second under 2003 CAP reform. 
4.  Results 
4.1 The case study 
The model has been applied to an illustrative case study, using data from the Commune of 
Argenta (Ferrara, Emilia Romagna). Two farm typologies were assumed, distinguished for the 
different typology of technical-economic orientation: mainly cereal crops for farm 1 and mainly 
vegetables for farm 2. The gross margin (that substitutes the profit in this simulation) functions and 
the compliance cost functions, for the variation, respectively, of the quota on nitrogen use and the 
reduction of nitrogen use with respect to the private optimum are reported in table 1. 
Table 1. Income and compliance cost functions. 
Farm Typology   Gross Margin Function  Compliance cost function 
Type 1 Agenda 2000  () q π = 73,286+11,962 q -0,0445 q
2  () r c = -0,3937 r +0,0217 r
2 Type 1 2003 Reform   () q π = 286,9+9,1941 q -0,0316 q
2  () r c = 3775,8 r -18,715 r
2 
Type 2 Agenda 2000  () q π = 7,8893+15,491 q -0,0449 q
2  () r c = 1,0793 r +0,0451r
2 
Type 2 2003Reform  () q π = 84,816+13,727 q -0,0366 q
2  () r c = 2866,3 r -18,369 r
2 
These functions are estimated using linear programming models, calibrated on structural data, 
derived to agricultural census and technical data derived to interviews to local experts. The gross 
margin and cost functions have been obtained by parametrising on a nitrogen use constraint (quota or 
reduction) and subsequently smoothing the response function obtained
3. In order to carry out 
simulations it has been hypothesized an homogeneous farm distribution across the two typologies and 
across target and non target areas ( j i, λ   = 0,25 for all farm types/areas). The budget available to the 
regulator has been assumed equal to 300 euro/ha. We have besides hypothesized the objective to 
achieve a half use of nitrogen (respectively a twice reduction) in target areas with respect to non target 
areas. 
4.2. Contracts based on input quota 
The optimal contracts structure for the Agenda 2000 scenario and using an instrument based on a 
payment associated to a quota on nitrogen input, show clear differences among different contract 
design solutions (table 2). 
Table 2. Results of different intervention options –Quota on nitrogen use – Agenda 2000 (B=300 
euro/ha,  j i, λ = 0,25, target = 0,5). 
 
q (kg N/ha) p  (euro/ha) average  q  (kg 
N/ha) 
    Type 1  Type 2  Type 1  Type 2   
    t  nt  t nt t nt t nt   
First  Best  51 51  90  90  303 303 297 297  71 











Second Best q  uniform  90 90  90  90  300 300 300 300  90 
First  Best  30 80  69  118 479 127 471 122  74 








Second Best q  uniform  64  128  64 128  520 80 520 80  96 
t=target area; nt=not target area 
Particularly, the contract menu shows the ability, with the same budget, to propose a nitrogen use 
quota 10% less than a uniform area payment. Targeting shows a relevant cost (in terms of increase of 
farm quota), but is apparently not prohibitive in presence of strong motivations for concentrating 
participation in target areas. However, the optimal contract structure (quota and payments by farm 
typology) result totally diversified among the different solutions, so denoting potential political limits 
in shifting from one form of contract to the other. 
The introduction of 2003 CAP reform, has the consequence of lowering the quota for the first best 
and for the menu of contracts, while the quota increases (worsen) for the unified payment (table 3). 
Table 3.Results of different intervention options – Input used quota – 2003 reform (B=300 euro/ha, 
j i, λ =0,25, target=0,5). 
                                                 
3 We do not include further details, since the single farm modelling does not represent the main objective of this 
work.   q (kg N/ha) p  (euro/ha)  average q (kg 
N/ha) 
    Type 1  Type 2  Type 1  Type 2   
    t  nt  t nt t nt t nt   
First Best  35  35  92  92  303  303  297  297  63 











Second Best q uniform  92  92  92  92  300  300  300  300  92 
First  Best  14 61  74  114 464 142 436 158  66 








Second Best q  uniform  65  130  65 130  514 86 514 86  97 
t=target area; nt=not target area 
This depends on the fact that 2003 reform generally tends to induce a reduction of input use and 
so it has an effect in terms of higher ability to meet restrictions in input use. 
However, it also increases the difference among opportunity cost in different farms, with respect 
to agri-environmental constraints, represented by the same nitrogen input quota. Therefore, only a 
higher payment differentiation is able to exploit the potential benefits of the new situation in terms of 
policy efficiency, while uniform contract solutions reach lower performances. 
4.3. Contracts based on the reduction of input use with respect to the private optimum 
In the case in which the program proposes an input reduction with respect to the private optimum, 
in the Agenda 2000 situation, the comparison between different contract s brings to considerations 
analogous to the previous case, however with a stronger difference between the menu of contracts and 
the uniform payment (table 4). 
Table 4. Results of different intervention options – Reduction of input use with respect to private 
optimum – Agenda 2000 (B=300 euro/ha,  j i, λ =0,25, target=0,5). 
   r (kg N/ha) p  (euro/ha)  average r (kg 
N/ha) 
    Type 1  Type 2  Type 1  Type 2   
    t  nt  t nt T nt t nt   
First  Best  147  147 54  54  408 408 191 191  100 











Second Best q  uniform  70 70  70  70  300 300 300 300  70 
First Best  167  96  86  30  539  163  424  73  95 








Second Best q  uniform  90 45  90  45  461 139 461 139  67 
t=target area; nt=not target area 
However, it should be noted that the solution proposed in this case may entail different 
control costs and have to be compared with the quota solution only after a cautious 
consideration of its actual implementability. 
The 2003 CAP reform has in this case a negative effect for all intervention hypotheses, with one 
decrease close to 20% of obtainable pollution reduction with the same budget level (table 5). Table 5. Results of different intervention options – Reduction of input use with respect to private 
optimum –2003 Reform (B=300 euro/ha,  j i, λ =0,25, target=0,5). 
   r (kg N/ha) p  (euro/ha)  average r (kg 
N/ha) 
    Type 1  Type 2  Type 1  Type 2   
    t  nt  t nt t nt t nt   
First  Best  98 98  64  64  331 331 269 269  81 











Second Best q  uniform  68 68  68  68  300 300 300 300  68 
First  Best  121 67  85  36  505 157 422 116  77 








Second Best q  uniform  88 44  88  44  448 152 448 152  66 
t=target area; nt=not target area 
Besides, the reduction is more clear in the first best and in the case of the menu of contracts, while 
it is almost irrelevant in the case of a fixed payment. As we saw before, the quota instrument seems to 
benefit of the fact that, under 2003 reform, farms show an autonomous reduction of pollution. This 
benefit do not extend to the further reduction of pollution. On the contrary, the cost of such further 
reduction appears increasing even for the farms with lower compliance costs. 
Again, both in the case of Agenda 2000 and in case of the post 2003 reform, the cost of targeting 
appears relatively low and worth strongest targeting policies. 
5.  Conclusion 
The paper add further evidence to the literature on AES contract design highlighting the potential 
benefits from the adoption of menus of contracts as compared to flat rate payments. Also, targeting 
policies, timidly promoted in Italy, may be pursued at a relatively low cost. 
In perspective, it should be expected that the 2003 CAP reform will have an impact on AESs 
compliance cost. Particularly, we should hypothesize that the mid term review through decoupling, will 
tend to reduce the opportunity cost of uptaking AESs contracts (at least for the schemes not 
competitive for land use) and then to increase the optimal production of AESs service. 
Using interventions typology of the same type now existent (flat rate and more often based on 
constraints on input use), the result could be an apparent improvement of effectiveness/cost ratio of 
AESs. However this result is reverse if we hypothesize schemes that produce an effective 
environmental improvement with respect to the optimal private result. 
For a better exploitation of the new context set by 2003 CAP reform, it is necessary to review the 
way AESs payment are assigned and they structure. In particular, a more courageous territorial policy 
tailoring is needed. However, at least for voluntary instruments, targeting does not appear to be able to 
solve present problems in AES implementation, if it is not accompany by a sufficient contract 
diversification (in both constraints and payments). Besides, the targeting of measures, because of the 
additional incentive costs, need to be correlate to the public willingness to pay, in relation to the 
effective benefits derived by society. 
The possibility and the strategy for contract improvement, is a function, both of the variability of 
the cost for the production of environmental services among farms, and of the effective degree of 
asymmetric information among actors, also in relation to the growing investment for the collection and 
processing of farming data. In perspective, the higher complexity of the menu of contracts may be 
justified in some cases, while the use of fixed payment could remain the best solution in other cases. The modelling approach adopted in this paper could be developed in different directions. A first 
issue concerns the connection of linear programming models and principal-agent models, that appear 
promising in interpreting, in the same framework, crop choices and farmers’ constraints, as well as 
their reaction to policy incentives. 
A second major issue for a deeper analysis may be found in the interplay between target areas and 
contract design. For example the optimal contracts structure could be studied in different hypothesis of 
correlation among priority areas and compliance costs. 
Besides, transaction costs that are additional with respect to incentive and information cost could 
be taken into account. Finally, the externality value and the opportunity cost of public funds should be 
included for moving from the cost/effectiveness approach towards a more complete social cost and 
benefit analysis. 
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